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Thank you to Kári Driscoll for the inviting me to give this talk. It’s a delight to visit 
Utrecht for the first time. The material I will be sharing with you is the basis of a chapter of my 
next book, How Not to Make a Human: Sympathy, Edibility, and Helplessness. How Not to Make 
a Human will follow sets of medieval texts, about pets, feral children, burial practice, and 
oysters, that present increasingly severe challenges to the common ideas that agency, free will, 
and rationality are the key characteristics of the human experience. It will contribute to the fields 
of critical animal studies, ecocriticism, and speculative realism, all of which are subsets of the 
field of posthumanism. 
Today’s talk will counter the common notion that stories of feral and isolated children are 
stories of isolation, masculine ferocity, and wildness. My examples will be the ancient legend of 
the language deprivation experiment, equally ancient stories of feral founders and culture heroes, 
and finally a set of late medieval stories from German religious writing about children raised by 
wolves. I will propose that what all these stories have in common is a concern with vulnerability 
and care and, of course, children. 
 
PART ONE: The myth of the existence of a single originary language dates at least to 
the Biblical story of Babel. From very early on, many commentators held that this first language 
was Hebrew, although a few outliers in both Christian and Muslim communities proposed that it 
was actually Syriac; in the sixteenth century, Jan van Gorp argued that it might in fact have been 
Flemish; while the first-century exegete Philo of Alexandria records a tradition that held that 
animals too once had a common language, before suffering their own fall into mutual 
incoherence. 
For those who really wanted to know, more than speculation was needed. There had to be 
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a test, and this test naturally focused on children, because they routinely demonstrate the 
transition from speechlessness to language. You may know that the Latin infans, from which the 
word infant derives, combines the negating prefix “in” and the present participle “fans” of the 
deponent verb “fari,” to speak. How did this speechless creature acquire language to become 
homo loquens, speaking man, and what did this acquisition say about our origins, both individual 
and even ethnic? 
The first record of such a practical investigation dates to the fifth century BCE, in 
Herodotus’s account of the Pharaoh Psamtik I’s attempt to discover who could boast of being the 
oldest people. He commanded that two newborns be taken from the common people and raised 
in isolation by a herdsman who was never to speak in their presence. After two years — and here 
I quote from an English translation of 1584 — “both the little brats, sprawling at his feete, and 
stretching forth their handds, cryed thus: Beccos, Beccos,” which Psamtik and his advisors 
understood as the Phrygian word for break. 
The story has always had its doubters, Herodotus included. Anyone familiar with ancient 
and medieval historiography would never take it at face value, and they would note, as I am 
doing right now, that other, equally grandiose claims clustered around this Pharaoh, just as they 
do for any powerful leader: in this case, for example, he was widely held to be the inventor of the 
labyrinth. No one would take that literally either. The story’s truth is a true record of an interest 
in a problem, rather than a simply true record of historical facts.  
This interest in this problem stretches across nearly two millennia, in accounts that I 
insist you recognize as at once fabulous and real records of real, philosophical and cultural 
interests. I will sum up that tradition very quickly: by the first century of our era, most readers 
knew Herodotus’ story only second hand, and medieval Europe had close to no knowledge of the 
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story, with its few, second-century points of possible transmission—in works by Clement of 
Alexandria and Tertullian—falling into almost total obscurity until the modern era. The story 
next appears in the thirteenth century, in chronicle about the Sicilian deeds of the Holy Roman 
Emperor, Frederick II, who wanted to know whether language-isolated children would, at the age 
children typically start speaking, produce Greek, Latin, Arabic, or perhaps even their parental 
language, whatever that might be. Again, let me stress that this is probably fiction: the chronicle 
includes this story amid a set of other imperial crimes: for example, Frederick has a scribe’s hand 
cut off for spelling his name “Fredericus,” with an “e,” rather than his preferred “Fridericus,” 
with an “i.” The story next appears in the early sixteenth century, in a Scottish history of their 
king James IV, who had two children raised in isolation by a mute nurse on a barren island just 
north of Edinburgh. Finally, the story is included in a great many records of the sixteenth-century 
court of the Mughal emperor Akbar, in chronicles kept in Persian by both Akbar’s allies and 
enemies, and in Italian and Latin by Jesuit missionaries, whose letters and memoirs helped 
spread the story throughout European early modern and Enlightenment philosophical, medical, 
and travel writing. 
Let me observe that, from the perspective of the emperor, most of the experiments fail. 
Psamtik’s children produce Phrygian, James IV’s Hebrew, but the rest produce no spoken 
language at all. Note that spoken language, as I’ll be coming back to it. The children of Frederick 
II’s experiment all die, because they have been denied emotional care: for it is not possible, as 
the historian observes, for a baby to thrive without being played with. And Akbar’s children, in 
all versions of this story, are heard to produce nothing but noise, thus proving, as one writer 
observed, that “letters and language are not natural to man,” but only the result of instruction and 
conversation. 
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The record of Akbar’s experiment changes frequently in its retelling, especially in one of 
its later versions, in 1708, in the General History of the Mughal Empire by François Catrou. 
Catrou says that Akbar has heard that Hebrew was a “natural language,” so he shuts up twelve 
children with twelve mute nurses, and a male porter, also mute, who is never to open the doors of 
the "château" in which they have all been confined. Twelve years later, to witness and deliver the 
verdict, Akbar has filled his court with judges, led by a Jew who will question the children in 
Hebrew. Another “failure”: all are astonished that they speak no language. But in this version, 
for the first time in the entire history of the experiment, the children acquire a language, one that 
no emperor had ever expected: they have sign language, taught to them by their nurse; as Catrou 
writes, “they express their thoughts only by gestures, which they use in place of words.” Care 
has found a way. 
These emperors are hunting for origins, and like many such hunts for what “just happens 
naturally,” the existence of things as they “really are,” they want culture without responsibility. 
They want the benefits of language, ethnicity, and religion, without having to own up to their 
choice to live through these particular manifestations of these categories. And like all attempts to 
find the pure thing, this hunt can only fail.  
What emperors discover instead is that the speaking child is not the origin of some 
authentic culture, but rather secondary to it, an ongoing effect within a feedback structure rather 
than a single cause. And in one version, what they especially discover is the surprising presence 
of care and community, of what escaped their attempts to close the children off from the world. 
What they discover is what the experiment already silently knows, for it is always an experiment 
with multiple children: between two and thirty, but never just one, always provided with at least 
one dedicated caregiver, always given a place of their own to live in. They recognize that 
 Steel, Utrecht 2016, Feral and Isolated Children  5 
 
language originates not in the self relating to its true, inner nature, but within interpersonal 
communication. Thus what they find instead, even in the silence of the children, is always the 
necessity of care. 
Ultimately, I am interested in what I can do with Agamben’s own use of the word infancy 
as a key critical term. He insists that speechlessness is both the necessary condition and the hope 
of communication. Agamben follows Walter Benjamin in arguing that the basic thing language 
communicates is communication itself. Communication requires the transmission of silence as 
well; it cannot be communication without some inbuilt inadequacy, for inadequacy preserves the 
possibility of communication being something more than just a mere exchange of basic needs, 
desires, and aims, of being more than what Benjamin derided as “the bourgeois conception of 
language.” Thus this inadequacy, figured as a silence or mystery within speech, holds open 
possibility, keeping a space clear for more communication to occur. We might take this 
inevitable silence as a figure of Agamben’s Messianic suspension of the relation between 
sovereignty and life, so key to his homo sacer project; but I prefer to take it, more humbly, as a 
figure of the preservation of need within any social encounter, and a preservation, as well, of an 
extra-linguistic referentiality in any communication. 
What is always present in communication is the “here I am” of speech, an unsaid “here I 
am” whose present silence is the preexistent, inescapable vulnerability that accompanies our 
basic having to be somewhere, of needing to be cared for, heard, and to take up attention that 
might be bestowed elsewhere. This here I am has none of the pretensions to immateriality that so 
often accompany claims to have the logos. I am really struck by the fact that one of the latest 
witnesses to this experiment finds a language that cannot pretend to be free of bodies. This 
account, especially, show that the “here I am” is necessarily also a “here we are.” But even in the 
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other accounts, in their supposed failures, we can hear a silence as calling for a circuit of mutual 
interest, mutual caring, mutual presence for each other, which cannot ever be done without. 
Infancy is always within communication and community. Infancy is always waiting in any 
attempt to get to the bottom of language, culture, and our civilization, whatever it may be. 
 
PART TWO: Herodotus again provides the first witness of the genre of story that 
interests me: he tells the story of the childhood of Cyrus of Persia, whom his uncle rightly fears 
will supplant him. His uncle orders one of his men to kill the newborn Cyrus; the man instead 
delivers the child to two slaves, a man, Mitradates, and a woman, Spako, whose name, 
Herodotus explains, is the Median word for “dog.” His foster parents raise him, in his 
adolescence Cyrus reveals his natural qualities of leadership by bossing around his playmates, 
and in adulthood he supplants his uncle and founds a great empire. 
In Herodotus’s source, Cyrus must have been first nurtured by a dog: this is evident in 
accounts that insist that the dog was really the woman, Spako; in others, like the twelfth-century 
version of Peter Comestor — that is, Peter the Eater — who speaks of an actual dog offering 
Cyrus her teat, and defending “him from wild beasts and birds”; and especially in stories that 
flowed from the same source as Herodotus drew his, in which animals feed and protect 
deliberately abandoned children. 
The most famous of these is of course the story of Rome’s foundation. Here the wicked 
paternal figure is an uncle, Amulius; the mother herself, variously named Ilia, Rhea, or Rhea 
Silva, is a temple priestess, and tends to quickly disappear from the story; the father of Romulus 
and Remus is either Mars, an unnamed suitor, or even Amulius himself, dressed up like a god, 
incestuous and conniving. Rationalizations rush in here as well; like others, Livy proposes that 
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the story’s lupa, a female wolf, is really just country slang for a prostitute or a loose woman. 
It has taken nothing but dogged research to pack this story with others about wild 
founding fathers, who all draw their outsized potency from the teats of some convenient canid. 
These stories in turn join with a swath of rampaging männerbünde, from Central Asia to Ireland, 
from the Dacians, Scythians, and Thracians, from Lombards to the Whelfs to the Guelphs, 
groups whose young men donned the names of wolves or wolf masks or who were styled in 
narrative or war propaganda as cynocphali - dog-headed humans — or even as werewolves. 
These stories, and often the scholarship too, imagine the canid as at once the figure of 
authority and its enemy, incarnations of wildness, power, cruelty, and even a kind of rough 
justice, inimical to women. Agamben’s discussion of Marie de France’s werewolf lai, 
“Bisclavret,” is probably the most famous treatment of this theme outside medievalist circles. 
The dogman as sovereign and as hero is isolated from mundane interconnections with the people 
he rules, or terrorizes, and even from the cultures he establishes. While he might make laws, he 
follows none of the petty rules that bind petty people. For the law at its heart is a wolf; it does 
what it wants. The sovereign is therefore also the outlaw, the figure who neither needs the law’s 
rules (because he decides what the law is) nor its protections. Notably, Romulus — the 
victorious, city-founding twin — recruits his first citizens from outcasts, bandits, and escaped 
slaves, as a clear a demonstration as we could want that the wild founder is an analog to the 
outlaw, the homo sacer, hounded by the law, and the hound of the law. Revolutionaries and the 
ordinary dispossessed already know this as well as cynics claim to, while academics tend to get 
the idea at greater length from Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” or Derrida’s “Mystical 
Foundation of Authority” or from Agamben, who alternately despairs at and hopes for some 
Messianic overcoming of the persistently, inevitably cruel relations between sovereign and his 
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subjects, public life and private life. 
This story is what we get if we fall in wholly with the myth of the canid’s wild 
carnivorousness and all that follows. The tangle of fascinations includes the dog being “man’s 
best friend,” with emphasis on the man, and the notion that true dogs are big dogs; the wolf 
being Europe’s most feared carnivore, ruled only by a logic of “might makes right”; and the 
Oedipal rivalry between patriarch and son over desire and satisfaction, incarnated by the mother, 
where the aim is to claim control of a paternal law that can never empty itself of its obscene core. 
A supposedly “disruptive” retelling of this story, with these actors, no matter how suspiciously it 
recasts the primal horde of Freud’s Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monothesism, will end up 
reinforcing rather than undoing the supposedly central importance of the story of sovereignty, the 
law, and its violence. Telling the story like this is a good way to stir up a keen sense of justice, or 
to assume a tone of anguished disapproval and “anxiety,’ but not a good way to get us something 
other than yet another “discovery” of the omnipresence of the beast of the law. 
As you no doubt recognize by now, this is not the way I want my story to go. I’ll first 
stress that wolves are not the only nurturing animals in these stories. Other spurned child stories 
feature goats and cows, animals more expected as milk-givers; we have mares, deer, leopards, 
and bears. Samiramis is fed by birds, and Hieron, wonderfully, by bees. Wolves might be 
common, and connect these children with bands of totemic canids from the Caspian Sea to 
Ireland, but goats are commoner. By remembering them, and the bees too, we can recognize that 
the story of the wild founder is also a story of the wild foundling. The commonality here is not 
the canid, with all its supposed wildness and danger, but rather the need to be fed, and its 
satisfaction. 
We can dissolve the arrogance and grandeur of the wild founder by doing more to 
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remember them as happy babies. Almost always, they are taken care of. The servant commanded 
to kill the children never quite does it; sometimes the men who should be killers are reminded of 
their own children, or they are struck by the child’s beauty, or its need. If we start the story here, 
not with the competition between father and son, and not with a boy’s alliance with the 
presumptive unruled beast that intimates the sovereign or warband, the story becomes one about 
care, sympathy, and weakness, but not about helplessness, except insofar as everything is 
helpless in itself, with some kind support.  
In short, the salvation for this material can be sought in a feminist ethics of care, which 
counters the rights-based and contractual ethics of the liberal humanist subject with attention to 
the inevitable mutual dependency of subjects, which all require care to thrive, at all stages of 
their life, but particularly in infancy and old age. In this framework, sovereignty and wildness, 
and the mystery of isolation in which they operate, cease to become the central problem of 
thinking community and relations. In this framework, we can better recognize what these stories 
might be doing other than simply retelling another myth of the supposed paternal origin of the 
law. Susan Dodds puts it neatly: "A vulnerability-centered view of the self and of persons is 
better able to capture many of our moral motivations and intuitions than can be captured by an 
autonomy-focussed approach."  
Here we have hot the illusion of autonomy, but the necessity of mutual aid. I draw this 
last term from a cluster of anarchist ecologists and geographers, such society is the natural law 
we should be thinking with, not the Malthusian “struggle of all against all.” Kropotkin’s Mutual 
Aid: A Factor in Evolution, published a little more than a century ago, observes that “science 
loudly proclaims that the struggle of all against all is the leading principle of nature, and of 
human societies as well. To that struggle, Biology ascribes the progressive evolution of the 
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animal world. History takes the same line of argument,” and against this clot of arguments, in a 
posthumanist story that stretches from the protozoa to nineteenth-century Russia, Kropotkin 
argues for the primacy of “mutual aid,” driven not by love, nor even by sympathy, but more 
simply, by the need for community. 
The law of all against all explains the wild men, founders and lawbreakers, enjoying the 
unregulated pleasures from which they issue their regulations. And if this is all one wants to 
explain, it works. But this law hardly accounts for the babies found and rescued, denied the 
society of the patriarch, yet still finding succor in the supposed wilderness. This is not the 
Lacanian baby, dangling at the cusp of a law and identity it can never satisfy; it is not even the 
Butlerian baby, perhaps to-be-mourned-for, hailed as a member of the community by our 
anticipating its social vulnerability and future death; it is a baby found and helped, the baby 
whose entanglement in community attests to law of mutual aid. 
 
PART THREE, AND LAST: Whatever their differences in the futures they offer their 
children, and whatever the fundamental contradictions in their projects, stories of language 
deprivation and feral founders each aim at isolation. The former deliberately isolate their 
children from communication, to see what paradigmatically human qualities will emerge from 
them spontaneously, and thereby give witness to the “natural” core of human qualities; the latter 
ultimately try to isolate the founder from mundane human upbringing, to give their hero the aura 
of the supernatural, and his authority an air of mystery. 
A new kind of story emerged briefly in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Germany, and 
then faded away. These stories stand apart from those of deprived children, as well as from those 
of heroic feral founders. After them, certainly from the seventeenth century on, we find no more 
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heroic feral founders. Instead, stories of children raised by animals become functionally 
equivalent to stories of children who suffer extreme social deprivation. The story of my small 
medieval archive therefore may well be unique in the long tradition of feral children stories. 
My stories are all from Latin, clerical sources; and they have barely captured the attention 
of scholars or storytellers. In comparison to the story of the Pharaoh Psamtik, or to Romulus and 
Remus, or to the many stories of “wild children” of the modern era, these stories are failures; but 
from the perspective of a critical animal studies and ecocritical perspective, they may be the most 
interesting of all. 
I’ll offer you three examples, reserving the fourth for further discussion later if that’s the 
direction our conversation goes. One of Jacques de Vitry’s sermon collections includes this 
story: “A she-wolf stole and suckled some children; when, however, one of the children 
attempted to stand upright and walk, the wolf struck him on the head with her paw, and would 
not allow him to walk otherwise than like the beasts, on his hands and feet,” in the Latin, cum 
pedibus ac manibus bestialiter. 
Next, we have Caesarius of Heisterbach’s Dialog on Miracles, structured like many 
medieval works as a conversation between a teacher and his student. When the master tells a 
story about a girl kidnapped by a wolf to act as a dentist to another wolf, suffering from a branch 
stuck in its mouth, the student tops his teacher with this story: “I saw a certain youth who was 
snatched up by wolves as an infant” — the Latin is in infantia — and was raised by them into 
adolescence, and he knew how to run on hands and feet in the manner of wolves, and how to 
howl.” 
Finally, and most substantially, we have the account I’m calling the Wolf Child of Hesse: 
“A certain boy in the region of Hesse was seized. This boy, as was known afterwards, and just as 
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the boy told it himself, was taken by wolves when he was three years old and raised up 
wondrously. For, whatever pray the wolves snatched for food, they would take the better part and 
allot it to him to eat while they lay around a tree. In the time of winter and cold, they made a pit, 
and they put the leaves of trees and other plants in it, and placed them on the boy, surrounding 
him to protect him from the cold; they also compelled him to creep on hands and feet and to run 
with them for a long time, from which practice he imitated their speed and was able to make the 
greatest leaps. When he was seized, he was bound with wood to compel him to go erect in a 
human likeness. However, this boy often said that if it were up to him, he much preferred to live 
among wolves than among men. The boy was conveyed to the court of Henry, Prince of Hesse, 
for a spectacle.” 
The two key things to observe in these several late medieval stories are their keen interest 
in posture and their tendency not to be much concerned with human reason. The “homo erectus” 
topos stretches at least from Plato to Freud. This is the assertion that the stereotypically upright 
human form allows, reminds, and even demands that humans direct themselves away from 
mundane desires and towards heaven, or, in its supposedly less theocentric, modern forms, that 
this form functions as a kind of incarnated superego or that it otherwise attests to our supposedly 
unique ability to abstract ourselves from our merely local surroundings. A relationship of touch, 
taste, and smell gives way to one where sight dominates; this is the sense that pretends to be able 
only to observe, without being involved. On the one hand, such interpretations of the upright 
form rescue humans from worldly entanglement; on the other, they lodge humans in a position of 
authority over other worldly life, for, as Robert of Melun’s twelfth-century doctrinal commentary 
observes, human bipedality shows that humankind “has rulership over other living things.” 
This insistence on human mastery found itself particularly required when faced with the 
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wolf. A belief as old as Plato’s Republic and repeated throughout the Middle Ages held that a 
human would be rendered speechless if a wolf saw them first. To put this in modern terms, the 
human captured by the gaze of a wolf has lost out in a zero-sum game of reason, in which only 
one party can ever have the logos and all that implies. Some of you may be familiar with 
Derrida’s now famous observation that, by and large, the main body of western philosophy has 
looked at animals — held them up as examples, sadly regarded their supposed innocence, and so 
on — without ever letting itself be “seen seen” by animals, without ever, that is, imagining that 
the animal could look back. The fear of the gaze of the wolf, this other widespread meateater, 
attests to this fear of being seen seen, and of losing our human privilege.   
Modern stories of feral children of course, and understandably, tend to speak of child 
who have lost or never gained the ability to talk. They insist that one party has to be effectively 
mute. One rare outlier is a girl from the Siberian city of Chita, never allowed outside the 
apartment, but — per the 2009 police report — conversant in the language or languages of the 
dogs and cats who raised her. Countering this tendency, one of these medieval feral children 
knows how to howl. He has gained a certain canine knack while among the wolves, but has 
otherwise lost nothing. As for the Hesse child, he loses nothing as a result of his peculiar 
upbringing except his ability, or desire, to walk upright. The child has no problem with human 
language; he assimilates poorly to human society not because he became irreparably animalized, 
but because he would prefer to be among the wolves. Here as elsewhere, disability is situational. 
These children become disabled only when the adult humans capture them and compel them to 
take on what they dictate as the proper human posture. 
We can contrast this with medieval werewolf tales, which by and large are very 
concerned with ensuring that we know that the werewolf remains reasonable. I know of only 
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one, Marie de France’s “Bisclavret,” that imagines that some new form of reason might emerge 
from the melding of human and lupine forms. We can imagine that this quadrupedal reason 
would be prone to the ground rather than endeavoring to maintain the illusion of uprightness, 
separation, abstraction, all the pretensions that travel under the rubric of “instrumental reason.” 
Down on all fours, leaping like a wolf, yet--or, even better, and--speaking, the Hesse child 
refuses the logics of dominant humanist traditions, medieval and otherwise, in which someone 
gets to be the human subject and someone has to be the animal object, there to be dominated, 
used, and observed by the one subject that presumes itself to have a rational, studious posture, 
the one that presumes itself able to do something more than simply replicate its instinct. 
Finally, in all this talk about care, it would be irresponsible to omit what it means to care 
for this boy. He has to be warmed and taught to run, but he also has to be fed, raising the 
question of what it means to be a messmate with wolves. The meliorem partem, the best part, 
that the wolves give the boy might describe not the portion size or the cut but the quality, so that 
meliorem partem is better than the usual cut of meat. It’s not just that the rare medieval 
references to the gustatory quality of human flesh invariably refer to it as the most delicious, 
most tender, and most restorative of meats, but also that we find such references even in the 
natural history of wolves: Albert the Great observes that if a wolf has eaten a human, it will seek 
out more “because of the sweetness of their flesh,” which a fifteenth-century hunting manual 
expands upon by saying that a wolf, having once tasted human flesh, will never again want to eat 
anything else. As I have argued elsewhere, this is the “best part” because anthropocentrism 
requires that humans retain their superiority, even while being eaten, by imagining themselves to 
be the particular object of desire of the other. But this form of human attachment takes a form in 
the story of the Hessian boy that suggests an attachment beyond anthropocentrism, a point we 
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might take up in discussion. 
*** 
A key background idea for this talk has been Derrida’s observation about the “nonpower 
at the heart of power” from his posthumous collection The Animal that Therefore I am. You 
might know that Jeremy Bentham argued that the key question about animals is not whether they 
can reason or speak but whether they can suffer. Derrida says that this changes everything: 
nonpower, the incapacity of any existing subject, now becomes the central question for thinking 
ethics and community, and becomes key to rethinking splits between animal and human life, or 
any other hierarchical relation that justifies itself on the basis of varying degrees of autonomy 
and powers. What I have also realized, perhaps very late, is that feminist ethicists have, for 
decades, been talking about exactly these issues, and that many critical animal theorists, 
including me, have only inadequately acknowledged their work. 
A secondary goal for this talk has been to suggest what premodern works have to offer to 
thinking in posthumanism. Nothing I have said here should be understood as an attempt to 
identify a kind of medieval “proto posthumanism;” rather I have illustrated that any systematized 
humanism — including the disguised humanisms that travel within stories of sovereignty — will 
always fissure under its own efforts at coherence. Posthumanism does not follow humanism, but 
is rather inherent to it.  
Modernity tends to believe that real history begins with it, and that the medieval is just 
the past, mostly homogeneous. Intellectual histories tend to skip from the classics to the early 
moderns, replicating the self-regard of the so-called Renaissance; for them, the medieval is 
incurious, instinctual, irrational; the medieval is the animal in relation to the human of the 
modern. Thus a posthumanism that plays with medieval materials may go a long a way towards 
 Steel, Utrecht 2016, Feral and Isolated Children  16 
 
upsetting the often unthought humanism of modernity. 
